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GREATER BOSTON ECONOMIC STUDY COMMITTEE



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a policy statement

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SOLVING
GREATER BOSTON'S
COMMUTING PROBLEM



Greater Boston Economic Study Committee
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BACKGROUND FOR GBESC POLICY STATEMENTS

The Greater Boston Economic Study Committee (GBESC) was organized in 1957. Broadly representative of commercial and industrial interests in the metropolitan area, the Committee presently has sixteen members -- fourteen are businessmen, one is a newspaper editor, and one the dean of a school of business administration. To help guide the work of the Committee, a Research Advisory Committee was appointed. This group consists of leading scholars and experts in metropolitan problems.

The Committee has two objectives. One is the gathering, organization, and circulation of basic economic data which will advance an understanding of the dynamic forces and trends operating in the metropolitan area; the other is to formulate policy recommendations which may both stimulate and advise leaders in metropolitan affairs.

The report here published is the first of the GBESC policy series. It has been evolved after extensive study and consideration on the part of the appropriate subcommittee, consultants to the GBESC, and staff; it was finally adopted by the Committee as it appears here. The recommendations which form the body of this report represent the views of the Greater Boston Economic Study Committee. Dissents, if any, are required by the rules of the Committee to be appended to its policy statements.

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SOLVING BOSTON'S COMMUTING PROBLEM

Introduction

Every weekday more than half a million people move into and out of downtown Boston.* This daily flow is divided among three transportation systems. Commuter trains of the New Haven, the Boston and Albany and the Boston and Maine railroads carry some 9% of the total. The buses, street cars and trains of the Metropolitan Transit Authority as well as buses other than the MTA's carry another 34% and the remaining 57% travel by private automobile.

The Greater Boston Metropolitan area is fortunate in having three highly developed systems for moving commuters to the central city. The three railroads provide commuter service on a dozen lines feeding into the downtown area from North, West, and South. The metropolitan Master Highway Plan laid down in 1948 calls for eight radial highways leading into the

*As used in this statement, the terms "downtown" and "central city" or their equivalent refer to all of the City of Boston lying east of Massachusetts Avenue, and include South Boston. The 'Greater Boston Metropolitan Area' and equivalent expressions used in this paper refer in general to the 65 cities and towns included in the United States Census Bureau's 1950 definition of the Boston Standard Metropolitan Area.

central city, connected by inner and outer circumferential highways. When completed, as we believe it should be, this plan will give metropolitan Boston a system of express highways second to none. Likewise the Metropolitan Transit Authority, despite its chronic financial troubles, provides the core of an excellent metropolitan rapid transit system.

Nevertheless, Boston has a serious commuting problem. The railroads and the MTA have been losing business to the highways for many years. This shift has resulted in three problems familiar to every citizen of Greater Boston.

The first is traffic congestion in the central city. Every year as more commuters take to the highways, downtown traffic conditions deteriorate and parking troubles multiply. These conditions weaken the competitive position of downtown Boston in retail trade and many other activities. They lower real estate values and are, in part, responsible for the City of Boston's chronic fiscal embarrassment.

The second problem is the financial difficulties of the MTA. As more and more commuters abandon mass transportation for their own automobiles, the MTA's persistent deficit grows and MTA service deteriorates. Yet the economy of the whole metropolitan area is critically dependent on an adequate rapid transit system.

The third is the predicament of the railroads. As commuters turn to the highways, the railroads lose commuter traffic and their financial losses on this business tend to increase. The railroads' natural response is to reduce commuter service. Although this process has been going on for many years, it has now

entered a critical phase. Already, the Boston and Maine has reduced substantially the number of its commuter trains. The Boston and Albany was recently given permission to abandon the Highland Branch, and the New Haven, under the terms of a federal court decree, is ready to abandon all commuter service on the Old Colony.

None of these problems is new. Nor are they unique to Boston. They have their counterparts in other American cities and, indeed, in large cities in many parts of the world. Their causes are well known to experts and in some places workable solutions have been found -- but not yet in Boston.

In this statement of policy, we shall try to point out some of the causes of Boston's commuting problem and to recommend the kind of public policy which we believe would overcome them.

The Problem

Background of the Railroad Crisis

Railroad commuter service in the Boston area reached a peak, in number of passengers and frequency of service, in the years before the first World War. Except during the two wars, it has been declining ever since.

Declining traffic in the face of rising wages and equipment prices has meant rising costs. Competition by motor vehicles with short haul railroad traffic, both passenger and freight, has prevented passenger fares being raised as rapidly as rising costs would dictate. It has reduced freight earnings to the point where they can no longer subsidize losses on commuter traffic. As a result, losses on commuter traffic have become increasingly damaging to the railroads' financial position.

In short, the railroads serving Boston commuters are caught in a vicious circle of rising costs and declining business. Fare increases have proved to be no solution. They have only accelerated the loss of traffic to the highways. To avert bankruptcy, the railroads must reduce operating losses. From their standpoint, further reduction or elimination of short haul commuter service is the obvious way out.

The MTA Deficit

Boston's rapid transit system, too, has been caught in a financial squeeze. Costs have risen sharply while political considerations and competition from the automobile have pre-

vented offsetting fare increases. As with the railroads, the problem is not new. The El's financial difficulties go back to the First World War and the MTA has had an operating deficit every year since its establishment in 1948. Last year the loss was about \$11½ million.

Unit costs have risen for a number of reasons, among them the decline in total patronage. Rapid transit in Boston has lost patronage to the highways even more rapidly than the railroads because, as the metropolitan area has spread out, the transit system has not been extended to serve it. By 1970, population in the Boston standard metropolitan area will be 18% greater than in 1950, while population in the area now served by the MTA will not have grown at all. The MTA which formerly served all of an earlier and smaller Greater Boston now serves an area containing less than 60% of the population of Greater Boston. By 1975, if the system is not extended, it will reach less than 50%

More important in its effect on unit costs than the decline in total patronage has been the change in the hourly pattern of traffic. The combined effect of population movement, automobile competition and downtown traffic congestion has basically changed the role of rapid transit in the commuting picture. Formerly the rapid transit system was the principal means of travel to the downtown area at all times of the day. Now its primary role is to serve rush-hour flows to the downtown commercial districts, which are relatively inaccessible to private cars.

Just how great this change has been is shown by the fact

that 43% of the MTA's downtown riders are concentrated in the morning and afternoon rush hours, as compared with 35% before World War II. Before World War II the MTA handled 40% of the daily total of trips to and from the central city and 48% of trips during the rush hours. Today the corresponding figures are 32% and 48%.

This explains, in large part, why the MTA's financial difficulties have become so serious. The system must have sufficient manpower and equipment on hand to handle rush-hour traffic. A good deal of equipment is therefore idle for much of the time and the large working force needed for rush-hour traffic is paid for a full day. The changed traffic patterns and overall loss of patronage also entail serious underutilization of the system's fixed facilities (particularly tunnels and subway stations) and their operating and maintenance personnel, further raising unit costs. Students' fares and legal requirements with respect to numbers of operating personnel add substantially to the deficit.

Attempts to eliminate the chronic deficit by raising fares and cutting the frequency and quality of service have proved no solution. They have only increased the incentive to commuters to desert the MTA for their automobiles.

The Automobile and the Economic Health of the Central City

Competition from the automobile is the common denominator of the MTA's and the railroads' financial troubles. The automobile has competed effectively because the cost to the individual commuter of driving is often less than the cost of using mass

transportation, particularly for the shorter hauls.

There is a substantial public subsidy to the motorist in the free use of the highways, though offset in part by gasoline taxes. The railroads and the MTA, on the other hand, must set fares high enough to cover the cost of maintaining tracks, tunnels, and other facilities and some part, at least, of capital charges. While the motorist does not normally include depreciation and maintenance in figuring his commutation costs, railroad and MTA fares must cover the cost of maintaining and replacing rolling stock. Moreover, a growing number of motorists believe they are getting more comfort and flexibility of service for their money than the traveler by train or rapid transit.

Traffic congestion and lack of downtown parking space do set a limit to the competitive advantage of the automobile and this is shown by the fact that 70% of rush-hour commuters still use mass transportation. But a large and growing number are willing to put up with traffic jams and parking troubles for the privilege of driving themselves to work.

These facts raise an important question for public policy. If an increasing number of commuters prefer to drive, why not solve the commuting problem by expanding the ability of the highway system to distribute and park motor vehicles in the central city?

The answer, we believe, is clear; to do so would require diversion of much valuable downtown land to non-productive use. If carried out on a considerable scale, it would mean a reduced

level of economic activity in the central city and would impoverish the metropolitan area as a whole. For example, if all Boston commuters now traveling by railroad and MTA were to shift to automobiles, some 75,000 additional parking spaces would be needed -- more than double the present number. These additional spaces in six-story garages would require land equivalent to 40% of all the land now devoted to commercial and industrial uses in the central business district. And still more valuable land would be required for widening streets, building access ramps and the like to handle the additional downtown traffic.

The illustration is doubtless extreme, but it shows why Boston's commuting problem cannot be solved by attempting to provide motor vehicle access and parking space to all who want to drive to work. The answer must be sought in a different direction.

Alternatives for Public Policy

Although commuters in growing numbers find travel by automobile cheaper and more convenient than travel by railroad or rapid transit, the automobile has become to the economy of Greater Boston a much more costly means of bringing people to work. The problem for public policy, then, is to make mass transportation more attractive to the commuter in terms of cost and service. That is the heart of Boston's commuting problem.

We do not believe that the change in relative costs and service need be very large. More than 40% of all persons traveling to the downtown area still use the railroads and the MTA, and this proportion is declining only slowly. If it can be stabilized indefinitely at about the present level, or raised somewhat, the problem would be under control.

If the highways provide no answer, the choice for public policy appears to lie between a public subsidy to the railroads and a major improvement in the scope and service of the MTA which might reduce its deficit. We favor improving the MTA. In any case, the subsidy to railroad commuting service, historically provided by freight revenue, is no longer available because of the end of the monopoly position of railroads in freight transportation.

A public subsidy to the railroads, whether in the form of direct subsidy, tax relief or public ownership and operation, does not go to the heart of the problem. As long as the subsidy continues, it can perhaps prevent the railroads from abandoning essential commuter service. But it will fail to cure the underlying causes of the railroads' troubles, because it does nothing to make commutation by rail more attractive to the commuting motorist.

Reliance on an improved MTA appears the better choice for two principal reasons. First, rapid transit service can be provided at a substantially lower cost per commuter than rail service. For longer distances, rail service may be cheaper and we believe that every effort should be made to retain such rail commuting services. This is further developed on subsequent pages.

Second, the MTA gives commuters direct access to much more of the downtown area than can the railroads. If the improvements in the MTA's downtown facilities recommended in 1947 by the Metropolitan Transit Recess Commission (Coolidge Commission) are made, the MTA's superiority over the railroads in this respect will be even more marked.

As the Coolidge Commission's 1947 Report put it,

The losses which the railroads have experienced in the operation of commuter service in the past already give promise of increasing in the future. Railroad equipment is too cumbersome and costly for short haul commuter service. The railroads cannot undertake to operate a system of rapid transit. They are not in a position to achieve the integration and unification which only a transit system under public ownership and operation can bring about.

Improving the MTA

The committee believes that the MTA's rapid transit lines should be extended far enough into the suburbs to reach the bulk of the population of the metropolitan area. This is the first and most important element of our recommenced program. The second is a marked improvement in the comfort and frequency of MTA service. Without a major improvement in quality of service, the MTA will be unable to attract new riders in sufficient numbers to replace lost rail service and to halt the loss of patronage to the highways. The third requirement is a sharp reduction in the MTA deficit and the fourth is the development of a more acceptable means of financing the deficit that remains.

Extending the MTA

Eleven years ago the Coolidge Commission analyzed Boston's commuting problem and proposed as a solution the extension of MTA rail service along twelve routes. This comprehensive and excellent report was the product of several years of intensive work. Engineering studies of proposed routes were made. Hearings were held to get the reaction of the public to the extensions proposed. Cost estimates were prepared. Legislation was drafted. The result was a carefully drawn program which, in its essentials, is as good today as when it was issued.

The present length of the MTA's rapid transit lines is

about five miles, or ten to fifteen minutes from downtown Boston. In order to utilize to full capacity the system's tunnel network and downtown stations, the main lines should be extended to a distance of ten to fifteen miles, with a maximum running time of 30-40 minutes. In essence, this is what the Coolidge Report recommended. We believe that recommendation provides a sound strategy for a new attack on the commuting problem.

Among the twelve extensions of MTA rail service proposed by the Coolidge Report are two which have a special urgency today. One is the extension from the Back Bay to Riverside over the tracks of the Highland Branch, which was voted by the General Court last year. This extension has long been needed. Coordinated with the MTA's Revere line, it will give Greater Boston fast East-West transit service, placing Logan Airport within a short subway ride of Riverside. Train service on the Highland Branch ended May 31st. Completion of the extension is therefore urgent so that the hiatus between termination of train service and the beginning of MTA service (which could have been avoided by action based on good planning) will be as brief as possible.

The urgency of an MTA extension over the tracks of the Old Colony from Boston to the communities of the South Shore is apparent. The threatened ending of South Shore commuting service on the Old Colony demands immediate action. MTA rapid transit service should be provided along the Old Colony tracks from a point south of Savin Hill (on the Cambridge-Dorchester line) to South Braintree and possibly to Brockton. Connecting

lines could be operated to Hingham and Whitman. The Cambridge-Dorchester subway system appears to have sufficient capacity to accommodate the additional traffic these extensions would generate. If necessary, there should be some form of temporary subsidy to assure continued rail service until replaced by MTA service.

There seems to be no satisfactory alternative to extension of the MTA. A proposal has recently been made to replace the Old Colony commuter service by running buses from points on the South Shore into downtown Boston. The proposal would require some 140 additional buses arriving and leaving during the rush hours. It is apparent what this additional traffic would do to traffic conditions on the South Shore and in downtown Boston. In our opinion, this alternative is impractical, even as a stopgap.

In addition to the Old Colony and Highland Branch extensions, we recommend that a third MTA extension be undertaken immediately from Sullivan Square in Charlestown over the tracks of the Boston and Maine's so-called Western Route to Reading and Reading Highlands via Malden, Melrose and Wakefield. Since there is an alternate route for B & M trains coming to Boston from points beyond Reading, no major track construction would be necessary, and this fact makes it logical to include the Western Route extension among the early steps in carrying out the program of the Coolidge Commission. Abandonment of commuter service on this heavily traveled line is not an immediate threat but continued attrition is likely and it would

be sound policy to initiate action without awaiting a full-blown crisis.

We have not made estimates of the capital cost of the three extensions. The cost of the Highland Branch extension is estimated to be approximately \$9.2 million. Estimates of \$3.7 million and \$6.5 million respectively were included in the 1947 Coolidge Report for construction costs on the Old Colony and Reading Highlands extensions. Prices and construction costs have risen substantially since 1947; on the other hand, it may be possible to omit a good deal of the work on these two extensions proposed by the Coolidge Commission. For example, use of the recently developed diesel-electric railcars, if feasible, would make electrification of the Old Colony and B & M tracks, proposed in the Coolidge Report, unnecessary. (These new cars can operate above ground as diesels and under ground as electric cars.) For another example, the track construction contemplated in the Coolidge Report alongside the B & M tracks to Reading may be omitted, since the railroad can give up the use of its tracks by using the alternate route via Wilmington.

Execution of these three proposals would be a useful, and indeed a necessary, test of the Coolidge Commission's recommendations before a commitment to the full program of extensions is made. By using existing track, an experiment can be carried out at relatively modest cost to test the underlying premise of the Coolidge Report that extended MTA service will be sufficiently attractive to commuters to replace rail service and halt the decline of mass transportation.

Improving the Quality of MTA Service

Extended MTA lines will not replace rail commuter service unless there is a drastic improvement in the quality of the MTA service offered. Commuters accustomed to traveling in reasonable comfort on trains with adequate seating and scheduled service will not accept the MTA's present equipment and they will demand careful scheduling.

MTA cars are designed to crowd as many standees as possible into each car. They may perhaps have been satisfactory in a day when the commuter had no choice but they are clearly inadequate to keep suburban passengers, used to the relative comfort of trains, off the highways. The equipment to be used on the extended lines must provide comfortable transverse seating and there must be sufficient car capacity to reduce standing to a minimum.

Frequent and fast train service on the basis of printed timetables is also a must. The Cleveland transit system has shown that schedules of this kind can be set up and followed. This improvement in service is as important, in our opinion, as adequate seating.

Reducing the Deficit

We do not know what effect the three MTA extensions here proposed would have on the MTA's operating deficit. Studies made by the Coolidge Commission showed that these extensions would probably increase revenue more than operating costs at the level of fares, wages and other costs then prevailing. Perhaps the same would be true today. The result would depend

very largely on success of the program in attracting riders, which cannot be accurately predicted. One thing is clear: completion of the three extensions proposed would tend to reduce unit costs by permitting a fuller utilization of downtown tunnel and station facilities, and of their maintenance and operating personnel.

Two things can be done to reduce the deficit. The MTA is now required by law to charge school children under 14 a five-cent fare. This legal requirement is estimated to account for some \$2-3 million of the MTA's annual deficit. It seems unreasonable to ask the towns and cities using the MTA to pay the whole of this loss when other kinds of school transportation are subsidized out of state funds. We believe that the loss to the MTA caused by students' fares should be paid for as what it really is, a contribution toward the transportation of school children.

The MTA is also required by law to have one guard to every two cars of a rapid transit train. This, we believe, is unnecessary. In Cleveland, one guard handles all the doors of a six-car train. In Toronto, one man handles the doors of an eight-car train, and in New York of a ten-car train. A change in this requirement would save the MTA upwards of \$500,000 a year. If this change is effected, simultaneously with the extension of rapid transit service, no unemployment need result, since the displaced manpower could find employment on the extended lines. We believe that on this basis the cooperation of labor would be readily forthcoming. Indeed, the whole program should be carried forward on the principle that no unemployment or down-grading

of transit workers should be permitted.

On the same principle, and to make intelligent use of the skilled men and valuable equipment displaced from railroad commuting service by these extensions, it is recommended that a study be made of the suggestion that substantially intensified and improved rail passenger service over longer distances be operated under a guarantee from the state that it will make up any failure of revenue to meet out-of-pocket costs. This would require agreement of the unions to operate rail diesel cars without firemen and unnecessary trainmen, an agreement which may reasonably be expected if the above principle is adhered to. Such service is obviously desirable to round out the transportation picture, but certainly cannot be expected from the railroads as a business venture under existing conditions.

If these two measures are taken, there is reason to expect a material reduction of the MTA deficit. Financing the remaining deficit, however, will remain a problem and a major obstacle to the program of extensions here recommended.

Careful study should be made of the costs of different parts of the MTA operation to see if it is true, as has been stated, that the transit lines are self-supporting and the deficit is incurred by feeder lines. If so, or even if partially so, an allocation of the deficit accordingly would have two beneficial effects. It would remove the fear of rapid transit extensions based on expected tax increases. It would also place the cost of a feeder line so close

to the users that more careful attention to the real need of the deficit-causing service would be assured.

Under the present law, the MTA deficit is financed out of tax money raised by the cities and towns directly served by the MTA. The deficit is allocated in proportion to the numbers of riders who board MTA vehicles within each town or city.

This allocation formula results in serious inequities. The City of Boston, for example, pays 54% of the total deficit -- a figure which seems out of proportion to the actual number of Boston taxpayers among those who board MTA vehicles within the city limits. A town or city which has an MTA rapid transit terminal serving several outlying towns, must pay in proportion to the number of all those boarding within its borders, although many of them come from outside.

These and other inequities, both real and imagined, are undoubtedly the most serious single major obstacle to the extension of the MTA. For example, resistance in Newton to the Highland Branch extension has been based in good part on the knowledge that many riders from towns to the West will use the Riverside terminal and inequitably increase Newton's share of the deficit. The deficit problem has been magnified out of proportion to its size but it is clear that something must be done about the allocation formula.

One approach would be to modify the formula, for example, to use the residence of riders (determined periodically by a sample survey), or the resident population of towns and cities

as a basis of the allocation. Another approach would be to get a part of needed funds from other tax sources. For example, a part of the state gasoline tax receipts might be used, if a way could be found around the obstacle presented by Article 78 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth. Or an additional registration fee or excise on automobiles registered in the metropolitan area might be charged, although the same legal obstacle would also be encountered. A fee or excise of this kind might be more acceptable if levied state-wide, the proceeds being used in the region where collected to help solve local transportation problems.

The latter ways of financing the deficit would shift some of the social cost of providing transit service to owners and operators of motor vehicles. There is both justice and economic logic in so doing. It is reasonable that the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, who benefits from a large public subsidy in the form of free highways and subsidized public parking facilities, and whose motor vehicle contributes to downtown traffic congestion, should be asked to pay a few dollars a year toward the maintenance of an adequate public transit system. And this payment would help make public transit more attractive as compared to commuting by automobile.

We have not attempted to decide among the many possible ways of financing the MTA deficit. The question is difficult technically and politically and we plan to give this

matter more study than we have yet been able to give it. Clearly, something better than the present allocation formula must be found if extensions of the MTA are to be accepted by the communities directly concerned.

* * * * *

The program recommended by the Committee can be fully successful only if it is adopted wholeheartedly and as a whole. If the lines are extended as proposed but without major improvement in the quality of MTA service, the program may fall short of complete success because the commuters will not respond. If the cost reduction measures proposed are not taken, the over-all size of the deficit will remain a serious obstacle to the extension and improvement of MTA service. And if imaginative efforts are not made to find a more acceptable way of distributing the burden of the MTA deficit, the program will likely fail of adoption.

But, if all these measures are taken and carried forward vigorously, we believe that the critical first step will have been made toward solving Boston's commuting problem.

The Need for Unified Planning of Metropolitan Transportation

In concluding this statement there is one lesson which seems to stand out -- lack of coordinated planning has intensified difficulties of the different elements of the metropolitan transportation system. It is plain, for example, that highway development has proceeded without sufficient reference to the problems of downtown traffic congestion and parking, on the one hand, and to the financial problems of the railroads and the MTA on the other. The public's demand for highways and the relative ease by which funds for this purpose can be raised have permitted highway development to go forward without regard for the problems created for the central city and the agencies of mass transportation.

Lack of coordination is due mainly to the fact that transportation planning and policy-making for Greater Boston are divided among a dozen independent agencies -- the MTA, the DPW, the Turnpike Authority, the DPU, the Federal Roads Administration, the MDC, to mention only a few. The town and city governments, too, are involved. What is needed is a body with responsibility to review all plans of public agencies affecting the transportation of people within the metropolitan area and to provide systematic guidance to the legislature from a metropolitan point of view. This body should be charged by statute with the duty of advising the General Court and other public bodies concerning all such proposals. Other public

bodies should be required by law to refer proposals to it for review and recommendation. We believe that a metropolitan planning commission, whose establishment is now under consideration, would be the logical agency to have this authority and to perform this function.

The need for metropolitan planning has, in recent years, been recognized by governors and legislators of both political parties. Let us be quite sure we are right before we make alterations in what, for ten years, has been accepted as a basically sound highway plan for the metropolitan area -- the so-called Master Highway Plan of '48 -- without adequate debate and consideration of the effect which these alterations will have on the existing highway network and other contemplated construction. The indefinite postponement of construction of the so-called "Inner Belt" and the proposed extension of the Massachusetts Turnpike beyond the "Inner Belt" to the Central Artery in the vicinity of the South Station are major changes in the Master Plan which, we believe, should be made only when supported by the same kind of careful engineering study and thorough discussion which preceded the adoption of the Master Plan itself. If changes of this sort are to be made in the Master Highway Plan which probably is the most important single evidence of forward planning for the metropolitan area which we have, then we seem to be moving further away from sound metropolitan planning.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Despite its excellent transportation facilities, Greater Boston has a serious commuting problem. The half-million or more people who enter and leave downtown Boston every weekday have been gradually deserting the railroads and the MTA for their private automobiles. The result has been serious traffic congestion downtown, large and increasing losses on commuter traffic for the railroads, and deficits for the MTA.

Eventual bankruptcy faces the three railroads serving Boston, unless they can reduce their losses by reducing commuter traffic. Highway development, necessary as it is for many reasons, is not the answer to the commuting problem because bringing many more cars into the central city would aggravate traffic congestion and create an insuperable parking problem. We believe that the only way out is to extend and improve the MTA, so that it will take the place of the railroads and become a more attractive alternative to the private automobile.

To this end, the Greater Boston Economic Study Committee proposes a nine-point program:

(1) The plan of MTA extensions proposed by the Coolidge Commission in 1947 should be adopted as an objective.

(2) MTA service should be extended immediately along existing railroad lines in three places:

-- Along the Highland Branch of the Boston and Albany from the Back Bay to Riverside, as authorized by the General Court last year.

-- Along the tracks of the Old Colony from Dorchester to South Braintree and possibly as far as Brockton. Connections to other South Shore points would be possible if sufficient demand develops.

-- Along the so-called Western Route of the Boston and Maine from Charlestown to Reading Highlands.

(3) The MTA should be authorized immediately to make the engineering and cost studies needed to obtain authorization of the Old Colony and Western Route extensions.

(4) Until MTA service is available, train service on the Old Colony should be assured -- if necessary, by means of a subsidy to the railroad. The subsidy should be paid for principally by the South Shore communities served.


(5) MTA cars used on the extended lines should provide comfortable transverse seating and should be sufficient in number to reduce standing to a minimum.

(6) The MTA deficit should be reduced by all possible means including removal of the burden of transporting school children at a reduced fare and modification of the two-cars-per-man rule on rapid transit trains.

(7) A more equitable way of prorating or otherwise financing the MTA deficit should be found and adopted.

(8) A metropolitan planning commission, whose establishment is now under consideration, should be given authority to study and recommend concerning all plans of public agencies affecting the movement of people within the metropolitan area.

(9) Pending the establishment of a metropolitan planning commission, no important changes in the metropolitan Master Highway Plan of 1948 should be made or authorized without both adequate study of the effects of such changes on the rest of the Master Plan and full opportunity for debate.



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